Appendix C
A book that travels through medicine, neuroscience, philosophy, and theology in roughly 96,000 words is going to use a fair number of technical words. I have tried, throughout the chapters, to define each term in plain English the first time it appears. But readers do not always read straight through, and sometimes a word from chapter eight surfaces again in chapter twenty-three after the original definition has slipped from memory. This glossary is for that moment.
The entries are alphabetical. Greek and Hebrew terms are italicized. Where a definition reflects a particular scholar's framing, or where the term is contested, I have added a brief footnote pointing the reader to a fuller treatment — usually inside this book, sometimes outside it. The goal is a reference any thoughtful reader can use, not a display of erudition.
A note on the categories. Three families of terms dominate this glossary: medical and neurological (the brain, the heart, the dying body); philosophical (consciousness, mind, matter); and theological (the soul, the intermediate state, resurrection). Many of the most contested terms straddle two or three of these categories at once. The richness of the conversation between disciplines is part of what makes near-death studies so demanding — and so rewarding.
After-death communication (ADC). A reported experience in which a living person believes they have received contact from someone who has died — through a sense of presence, a dream, a voice, or some other perception. Studied as a category distinct from NDEs, but with overlapping evidential significance.1
Annihilationism. The view that the unsaved are not punished forever in conscious torment but are ultimately destroyed by God after the final judgment. Closely related to conditional immortality, though some writers distinguish the two.
Apparition. A perceived encounter with a deceased person, typically involving a visual or strongly sensed presence. Crisis apparitions — those reported around the time of the person's death, often before the percipient knew of the death — are an important category in the older psychical-research literature and in modern grief studies.
AWARE study. The "AWAreness during REsuscitation" research program led by Sam Parnia, designed to test whether cardiac-arrest survivors who report out-of-body perceptions can identify hidden visual targets placed near the ceiling of resuscitation rooms. AWARE I (2014) and AWARE II (2023) provide some of the most rigorous prospective NDE data in clinical settings.2
Autoscopic experience. From the Greek autos ("self") and skopein ("to look at"). A perceptual experience in which a person sees a double of themselves, usually positioned in front of them at some distance. Distinct from the out-of-body experience, in which the perceiving self relocates and views the body from elsewhere.
Brain death. A clinical and legal definition of death in which all functions of the entire brain — including the brain stem — have permanently and irreversibly ceased. Brain death is distinct from cardiac arrest (often reversible) and from vegetative states (in which some brain-stem function persists). NDEs do not occur during established brain death; they occur during clinical death, from which patients are sometimes resuscitated.
Cardiac arrest. The sudden cessation of effective heart function. Without resuscitation, blood flow to the brain stops within seconds, and electrical activity in the cortex flatlines on EEG within roughly ten to twenty seconds. Many of the most evidentially strong NDEs occur in this window.3
Clinical death. A working term for the period during which the heart has stopped, breathing has ceased, and there is no measurable cortical activity — but resuscitation may still restore life. Clinical death is the typical setting for veridical NDEs.
Conditional immortality (CI). The theological view that immortality is not a natural endowment of the human soul but a gift of God, given to those united to Christ. The unsaved, on this view, do not endure conscious torment forever but ultimately perish. Conditional immortality does not require physicalism; it is fully compatible with substance dualism and a conscious intermediate state.4
Confabulation. The unintentional production of a false memory that the rememberer sincerely believes to be accurate. Often offered as a skeptical explanation of NDE accounts. Useful as a concept, but a poor fit for veridical perception of specific, checkable details that the experiencer could not have known.
Deathbed vision (DBV). A reported experience near the moment of death — often witnessed by hospice workers, family, or physicians — in which the dying person sees and converses with deceased relatives, religious figures, or radiant beings. Studied systematically since Sir William Barrett's Death-Bed Visions (1926) and Karlis Osis and Erlendur Haraldsson's later cross-cultural work.5
Dualism. See substance dualism; property dualism.
ECE (Experience of Clinical Endangerment). Michael Marsh's preferred substitute for "near-death experience." Marsh argues that the term avoids prejudging whether the patient was actually near death and avoids loaded religious connotations. This book retains the standard terms NDE and OBE for clarity and continuity with the broader literature, while engaging Marsh's terminology where he uses it.6
EEG (electroencephalogram). A test that measures the brain's electrical activity through electrodes placed on the scalp. A flat or "isoelectric" EEG indicates that cortical electrical activity has effectively stopped. EEG findings during cardiac arrest are central to the timing argument: experiencers report rich, structured awareness during periods when the EEG should preclude conscious experience under physicalist assumptions.
Endorphin. One of a class of natural chemicals produced by the brain that bind to opioid receptors and can dampen pain. Endorphin release has been proposed as a partial mechanism for NDE features such as pain relief and euphoria — but it cannot account for veridical perception or the structured content of strong NDE accounts.
Eschatology. The branch of theology concerned with the "last things" — death, judgment, the intermediate state, resurrection, and the eternal destinies of the saved and the lost.
Filter (or transmission) model. The view, articulated in different ways by William James, F. W. H. Myers, Henri Bergson, Aldous Huxley, and contemporary defenders, that the brain functions not as the producer of consciousness but as a filter, transmitter, or constraint upon a wider mind. On this model, the brain's collapse may release rather than destroy aspects of consciousness — making NDEs intelligible as moments when the filter is partially lifted.7
G-LOC (G-force-induced loss of consciousness). A loss of awareness experienced by pilots and centrifuge subjects when high gravitational forces drain blood from the brain. Sometimes cited as a comparison to NDEs because of brief tunnel-like or peaceful sensations. The differences are large: G-LOC episodes are short, fragmentary, and lack the coherence, veridical perception, and life-changing aftereffects characteristic of strong NDEs.
Greyson NDE Scale. A 16-item, validated psychometric scale developed by Bruce Greyson in 1983 for identifying and quantifying NDEs. A score of seven or higher classifies the experience as an NDE. The scale is the most widely used research instrument in the field.8
Hades. The Greek term used in the Septuagint and the New Testament to translate the Hebrew Sheol. A general designation for the realm of the dead, sometimes used more specifically (as in Luke 16:23) for the place where the wicked await final judgment.
Hard problem of consciousness. A term coined by philosopher David Chalmers for the mystery of why physical processes in the brain are accompanied by subjective experience at all. The "easy problems" concern explaining cognitive functions; the hard problem is explaining why there is something it is like to undergo those functions. The hard problem provides one of the strongest philosophical considerations against reductive physicalism.9
Heautoscopy. A rare neurological condition in which a person experiences a double of themselves and may seem to alternate perceptual perspective between body and double. Sometimes cited by skeptics as a neurological analogue to OBEs. Important differences: heautoscopy is fragmentary and disorienting; NDE-OBEs are typically clear, coherent, and capable of producing veridical detail.
Holism (biblical anthropology). The view, common among modern Old Testament scholars, that the Hebrew Bible portrays the human person as a unity rather than as a body-soul composite. Some interpreters take holism as evidence for physicalism. Others — including John W. Cooper — argue that holism describes the normal state of human existence without ruling out a real, conscious intermediate state at death.10
Hypercarbia. An abnormally elevated level of carbon dioxide in the blood. Sometimes proposed as a partial trigger for NDE-like phenomena. Like hypoxia, hypercarbia explanations cannot account for the veridical perceptual element of strong NDEs.
Hypnagogic. Pertaining to the transitional state between wakefulness and sleep, often accompanied by dreamlike imagery. Sometimes invoked to explain NDEs. The comparison fails: NDE accounts are typically clearer, more coherent, and longer in subjective duration than hypnagogic episodes — and produce veridical content that hypnagogia does not.
Hypnopompic. Pertaining to the transitional state between sleep and wakefulness. Like hypnagogic states, sometimes proposed as a model for NDEs; the same problems apply.
Hypothermic cardiac arrest. A surgical technique — most famously associated with the Pam Reynolds case — in which the patient's body is cooled to extreme temperatures, the heart is stopped, the blood is drained from the brain, and the EEG flatlines. Used to allow surgery on otherwise inoperable cerebral aneurysms. NDEs reported during such procedures pose a special challenge to dying-brain explanations because conscious experience is supposed to be impossible under these conditions.
Hypoxia. A reduced supply of oxygen to the body or a specific tissue, especially the brain. Skeptics often invoke hypoxia as the engine of NDEs. Two main problems: many cardiac-arrest NDEs occur with no intermediate hypoxic phase, and hypoxia produces confused, fragmented experiences — not the lucid, structured, veridical accounts characteristic of NDEs.
Intermediate state. The condition of the human person between bodily death and the future bodily resurrection. Historic Christian teaching, traceable through the New Testament, the early creeds, and the Reformation, holds that this state is conscious — the saved are with Christ (Phil. 1:23; 2 Cor. 5:8); the wicked await judgment (Luke 16; 1 Pet. 3:19; Rev. 6:9–11). Veridical NDEs corroborate the consciousness of this state, though they do not occur after final death.11
Ketamine. A dissociative anesthetic that can produce experiences featuring out-of-body sensations, dreamlike imagery, and feelings of unity. Cited especially by Karl Jansen as a chemical model for NDEs. Strong objection: ketamine experiences are typically chaotic, frightening, recognized by the user as drug-induced, and lack veridical perceptual content. NDEs are usually peaceful, structured, transformative, and (in the strong cases) veridical.
Life review. A reported feature of many NDEs in which the experiencer perceives, at great speed and with great vividness, scenes from their entire life — sometimes including the felt impact of their actions on others. The life review is among the most morally and theologically loaded features of the NDE.
Mind-body problem. The general philosophical question of how mental events relate to physical events — how thoughts, feelings, and intentions are connected to brains and bodies. Substance dualism, physicalism, monism, property dualism, and various intermediate views are proposed answers.
Monism. The view that reality is composed of a single kind of thing or substance. Physicalist monism holds that the only reality is physical; idealist monism holds that the only reality is mental. Christian theology has traditionally affirmed creator-creature dualism (God is wholly distinct from creation) while making distinct claims about whether human nature is monistic (one substance) or dualistic (body and soul).
NDE (near-death experience). A profound, conscious experience reported by some people during periods of medical crisis — including cardiac arrest, severe trauma, or proximity to death. Common features include a sense of leaving the body, a movement through darkness or a tunnel, encounters with light, deceased loved ones, or religious figures, life review, peace, and a return to the body. The Greyson NDE Scale provides the standard research definition.
Nephesh. A Hebrew term commonly translated "soul," "life," "self," or "person." In the Hebrew Bible, nephesh often denotes the whole living being rather than an immaterial part. Yet certain texts (e.g., Gen. 35:18; 1 Kings 17:21–22) use nephesh in ways consistent with a separable life-principle, supporting a holistic anthropology that nevertheless allows a conscious intermediate state.12
Nonreductive physicalism. The view that human persons are wholly physical entities — there is no immaterial soul — but that mental properties are not strictly reducible to physical properties. Proponents include Nancey Murphy and (in more guarded form) Joel Green. Critiques argue that nonreductive physicalism either collapses into reductive physicalism or smuggles in the very dualistic features it sought to deny.13
OBE (out-of-body experience). An experience in which one perceives the world from a vantage point outside the physical body. OBEs occur within NDEs but also in other contexts (sleep paralysis, ketamine, certain neurological conditions). The evidentially strong OBEs are those in which the experiencer accurately perceives details that could not have been known from the body's location — that is, veridical OBEs.
Physicalism. The view that human beings are wholly physical — there is no immaterial soul. Strong (reductive) physicalism holds that mental phenomena are nothing but physical phenomena; weaker (nonreductive) versions allow mental properties without immaterial substances. NDE evidence — especially veridical perception during periods of brain inactivity — places significant pressure on every form of physicalism.
Pneuma. A Greek term for "spirit," "breath," or "wind." In the New Testament, pneuma designates the human spirit (e.g., Luke 23:46; Heb. 12:23) and, with appropriate qualifiers, the Holy Spirit. The use of pneuma for what departs the body at death (Luke 23:46; Acts 7:59; James 2:26) supports a substance-dualist reading of New Testament anthropology.
Production model. The view, dominant among contemporary neuroscientists, that the brain produces or generates consciousness. On this model, no brain activity entails no conscious experience. Veridical NDEs during cardiac arrest pose a serious challenge to the production model — and are intelligible on the alternative filter model.
Property dualism. The view that there is only one kind of substance (the physical) but two irreducibly distinct kinds of properties — physical and mental. A halfway house between reductive physicalism and full substance dualism. Critics argue that property dualism inherits the difficulties of physicalism without fully solving them.
Psyche. A Greek term for "soul," "life," or "self." Like Hebrew nephesh, psyche often denotes the whole person, but is also used in ways that imply a separable conscious aspect — most clearly in passages such as Matt. 10:28 and Rev. 6:9, where the psyche persists after the death of the body.
Qualia. Singular, quale. The subjective, felt qualities of conscious experience — the redness of red, the painfulness of pain, the bitterness of coffee. The existence of qualia is closely tied to the hard problem of consciousness; their resistance to reductive physical explanation is one of the most discussed considerations in contemporary philosophy of mind.
REM intrusion. The intrusion of features of REM (rapid-eye-movement) sleep — dream imagery, atonia, vivid emotion — into waking consciousness. Kevin Nelson's hypothesis is that NDEs are episodes of REM intrusion. Difficulties: REM-intrusion phenomena are well known to neurologists, are usually fragmentary and dreamlike, and do not produce veridical perception of distant events.14
Resurrection. The historic Christian doctrine that human bodies will be raised from death — transformed and incorruptible — at the return of Christ. Resurrection is the final destiny of the human person; the intermediate state is a transitional condition between death and resurrection. Resurrection and a conscious intermediate state are not in tension; both are taught in the New Testament.
Ruach. A Hebrew term for "spirit," "wind," or "breath," similar in semantic range to pneuma. Ruach is the divine breath that animates the human person (Gen. 2:7; Eccl. 12:7) and is sometimes used in ways that suggest a separable life-principle.
Shared death experience (SDE). A reported experience in which someone in good health, in the presence of a dying person, perceives elements of what appears to be the dying person's transition — a sense of light, a presence, even a brief sensation of accompaniment. Studied especially by Raymond Moody and William Peters. SDEs corroborate aspects of the NDE picture from a witness who is not themselves near death.
Sheol. The Hebrew designation for the realm of the dead. Sheol in the Old Testament is the common destination of all who die — a shadowy, conscious-but-diminished existence — though later biblical revelation distinguishes between the destinies of the righteous and the wicked.
Soul sleep (psychopannychism). The view that the soul is unconscious between death and resurrection — sometimes held as a corollary of physicalism, sometimes as an independent theological position. Veridical NDEs and the natural reading of New Testament texts (e.g., Phil. 1:23; Luke 23:43; 2 Cor. 5:8) tell against soul sleep.
Substance dualism. The view that human beings are composed of two distinct kinds of substance — a physical body and an immaterial soul (or mind, or spirit). The soul is the bearer of consciousness, identity, and moral agency, and is capable of continuing in conscious existence apart from the body. Substance dualism in various forms has been the dominant Christian anthropology for most of church history and remains the most natural fit with the NDE evidence.15
Temporal lobe epilepsy. A type of epilepsy in which seizures originate in the temporal lobes of the brain. Sometimes proposed (notably by Michael Persinger) as a model for religious and out-of-body experiences. The model fails for NDEs because temporal-lobe phenomena are typically fragmentary, dysphoric, and lack veridical content.
Temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). A region of the brain where the temporal and parietal lobes meet, involved in integrating bodily, spatial, and visual information. Olaf Blanke's stimulation studies in TPJ-region patients are often cited as evidence that OBEs are mere brain illusions. On close reading, the studies do not produce true OBEs — they produce illusory body experiences that lack veridical content.16
Terminal lucidity. The brief, unexpected return of mental clarity in patients whose brains have been severely damaged by dementia, encephalitis, or other conditions — sometimes occurring in the hours or days before death. Terminal lucidity is difficult to reconcile with strict production models of consciousness; the lucidity occurs despite, not because of, the brain's continuing collapse.17
Transmission model. See filter model.
Universalism (biblical or Christian). The view that, ultimately, all persons will be reconciled to God through Christ. To be distinguished from religious pluralism (the view that all religions are equally valid). Held in conservative form by some who affirm hell as real but not necessarily final.
Veridical NDE. An NDE in which the experiencer accurately perceives objective details — events, objects, conversations, locations — that could not have been known by ordinary sensory means from the body's location. Veridical NDEs are the evidential heart of the case for survival of consciousness; ordinary subjective NDEs, however vivid, are not by themselves evidentially decisive.18
A closing word. Definitions matter. A great deal of the debate over near-death experiences turns not on the data but on how the terms are framed. Skeptics who define "consciousness" as "what the brain produces" have already settled the dispute by definition before a single case is examined. Christians who define "soul" as "something nonbiblical Greeks invented" have done the same. This glossary aims to keep the words honest — so that the evidence, rather than the vocabulary, can do the heavy lifting.
↑ 1. See Bill Guggenheim and Judy Guggenheim, Hello from Heaven! (New York: Bantam, 1995), and J. Steve Miller, Deathbed Experiences as Evidence for the Afterlife, ch. 8.
↑ 2. Sam Parnia et al., "AWARE — AWAreness during REsuscitation: A Prospective Study," Resuscitation 85, no. 12 (2014): 1799–1805; Parnia et al., "AWARE II," Resuscitation (2023). Discussed at length in ch. 4 of this book; the timing question is treated in ch. 17.
↑ 3. Pim van Lommel et al., "Near-Death Experience in Survivors of Cardiac Arrest: A Prospective Study in the Netherlands," The Lancet 358 (2001): 2039–2045; Chris Carter, Science and the Near-Death Experience, ch. 7.
↑ 4. See Edward Fudge, The Fire That Consumes, 3rd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2011); Glenn Peoples, "Why I Am a Conditionalist," in Rethinking Hell, ed. Christopher M. Date, Gregory G. Stump, and Joshua W. Anderson (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2014). The compatibility of CI with substance dualism is treated in ch. 26.
↑ 5. Karlis Osis and Erlendur Haraldsson, At the Hour of Death, 3rd ed. (Norwalk, CT: Hastings House, 1997); J. Steve Miller, Deathbed Experiences as Evidence for the Afterlife, chs. 1–4. Treated fully in ch. 9.
↑ 6. Michael N. Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences, p. xvii. The reasons for retaining the standard NDE/OBE terminology are discussed in ch. 2.
↑ 7. William James, Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1898); Aldous Huxley, The Doors of Perception (1954); Edward F. Kelly et al., Irreducible Mind (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), ch. 9. Engaged in chs. 23–25.
↑ 8. Bruce Greyson, "The Near-Death Experience Scale: Construction, Reliability, and Validity," Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 171 (1983): 369–375. Introduced in ch. 2.
↑ 9. David J. Chalmers, "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness," Journal of Consciousness Studies 2, no. 3 (1995): 200–219; Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Treated fully in ch. 23.
↑ 10. John W. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000); contrast Joel B. Green, Body, Soul, and Human Life (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008). Engaged fully in chs. 26–27.
↑ 11. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chs. 5–7; Hank Hanegraaff, Afterlife, chs. 4–5. Treated fully in chs. 26–27.
↑ 12. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chs. 2–3. The full case for biblical anthropology supporting a conscious intermediate state is developed in ch. 26.
↑ 13. Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); critique in J. P. Moreland, The Soul: How We Know It's Real and Why It Matters (Chicago: Moody, 2014), ch. 5; Brandon Rickabaugh and J. P. Moreland, The Substance of Consciousness (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2024). Engaged in ch. 25.
↑ 14. Kevin Nelson, The Spiritual Doorway in the Brain (New York: Dutton, 2011); critique in Carter, Science and the Near-Death Experience, ch. 14. Engaged fully in ch. 15.
↑ 15. Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, A Brief History of the Soul (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011); Richard Swinburne, Are We Bodies or Souls? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); Moreland, The Soul. Treated fully in ch. 24.
↑ 16. Olaf Blanke et al., "Stimulating Illusory Own-Body Perceptions," Nature 419 (2002): 269–270; critique in Carter, Science and the Near-Death Experience, ch. 11. Engaged fully in ch. 13.
↑ 17. Michael Nahm and Bruce Greyson, "Terminal Lucidity in Patients with Chronic Schizophrenia and Dementia," Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 197 (2009): 942–944; Miller, Deathbed Experiences as Evidence for the Afterlife, ch. 5. Treated in ch. 9.
↑ 18. Janice Miner Holden, "Veridical Perception in Near-Death Experiences," in Janice Miner Holden, Bruce Greyson, and Debbie James, eds., The Handbook of Near-Death Experiences (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2009), ch. 9. The veridical-perception case is developed across chs. 4–9.